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ABSTRACT: The aim of the paper is to clarify the concept of scientific ignorance: what is it, what are 
its sources, and when is it epistemically detrimental to science. While some sources of scientific ignorance 
come inevitably with the process of knowledge acquisition, others are deliberately created. The former 
includes selection processes, inductive reasoning, and cognitive biases, while the latter includes scientific 
fraud. Another important source of scientific ignorance appears when scientists introduce methodologi-
cal biases through micro-decisions in the research process. I provide three examples from medical research 
to illustrate this point. I argue further that methodological biases present a challenge, in so far as they are 
no easily classifiable as deliberate: they might also be the result of entrenched research practices within 
a scientific community. Strategies to identify and prevent methodological biases in research should take 
into account such difference. 
KEYWORDS: scientific ignorance, agnotology, cognitive biases, selective ignorance, medical research, 
methodological biases. 
RESUMEN: El objetivo del artículo es aclarar el concepto de ignorancia científica: qué es, cuáles son sus 
fuentes y cuándo es epistémicamente perjudicial para la ciencia. Mientras que algunas fuentes de ignoran-
cia científica vienen dadas inevitablemente con el proceso de adquisición de conocimiento, otras se crean 
deliberadamente. Las primeras incluyen los procesos de selección, razonamiento inductivo y sesgos cog-
nitivos, mientras que las segundas incluyen el fraude científico. Otra fuente importante de ignorancia 
científica aparece cuando los científicos introducen sesgos metodológicos a través de micro-decisiones en 
el proceso de investigación. Proporciono tres ejemplos de investigación médica para ilustrar este punto. 
Además, sostengo que los sesgos metodológicos representan un desafío, en la medida en que no son fácil-
mente clasificables como deliberados: también podrían ser el resultado de prácticas de investigación arrai-
gadas dentro de una comunidad científica. Las estrategias para identificar y prevenir los sesgos metodoló-
gicos en la investigación deben tener en cuenta dicha diferencia.
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1. Introduction
The pursuit of knowledge is one of the main reasons scientific research exists. However, 
science not always serves the most epistemically fruitful goals. As the emerging field of ag-
notology, or the epistemology of ignorance, illustrates, scientific research also contributes 
to the production of ignorance (Proctor & Schiebinger 2008; Sullivan & Tuana 2007). On 
the one hand, this is inevitable. Given science’s limited resources, research must focus on 
understanding certain phenomena, while leaving others aside. In this sense, the more sci-
entists know about the phenomena they research, the more ignorant they become about 
the phenomena left aside. On the other hand, scientific research can miss the understand-
ing of epistemically or socially significant phenomena, if research is targeting distracting 
aims. This happened for decades with research on the genetic causes of lung cancer, which 
actively ignored the health hazards of tobacco smoking (Proctor 2012). Distinguishing be-
tween cases in which scientific ignorance emerges as an inevitable counterpart of scientific 
knowledge and cases in which ignorance is the product of research interests that go against 
epistemic or social aims is fundamental to identifying preventive measures for detrimental 
cases of scientific ignorance. 
Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to provide a philosophical analysis of scientific ig-
norance: what is it, what are its sources, and when is it epistemically detrimental to the sci-
entific enterprise. First, I provide a brief introduction to the social studies of ignorance 
and its relation to science. Second, I offer a working definition of scientific ignorance as 
non-knowledge resulting from processes of scientific knowledge production. Third, I 
propose a taxonomy of sources of scientific ignorance, distinguishing between inevitable 
sources of scientific ignorance that emerge from the constraints attached to the production 
of scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and deliberate sources of scientific ignorance, 
which are related to the way scientific research is sometimes inadequately set up to deliver 
certain results and not others, on the other hand. I also present methodological biases as 
another significant source of scientific ignorance, and I provide three examples from med-
ical research to illustrate that different decisions in the research process can end up com-
promising the reliability of scientific results, producing ignorance instead of knowledge. I 
argue further that methodological biases present a challenge, in so far as they are no eas-
ily classifiable as deliberate: they might also be the result of entrenched research practices 
within a scientific community. Strategies to identify and prevent methodological biases in 
research should take into account such difference. 
2. Agnotology and the social studies of ignorance
Our human desire to know the world around us goes hand in hand with the extension of 
our ignorance. We seek knowledge because we are ignorant and, as we accumulate more 
and more knowledge of our surroundings, we hope to be less and less ignorant. Scholars in-
terested in the study of ignorance have challenged this traditional conception of ignorance 
as a natural vacuum that ought to be filled with knowledge, introducing a broader con-
ception that includes ignorance as the product of social forces (Mills 1997; Proctor 2008; 
Smithson 1989). For instance, in addition to the traditional conception of ignorance as na-
tive state, ignorance can also be the product of the social conditions in which science is pro-
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duced, i.e., the inevitable lost realm of scientific knowledge, or even the deliberate product 
or strategic ploy of partisan interests (Proctor 2008, 6). These distinctions will become clear 
in the following sections but notice for now that in both cases ignorance is no longer a nat-
ural state, but a social construction, i.e., the result of social processes. 
Agnotology, or the epistemology of ignorance, has recently emerged as a subfield inter-
ested in these social dimensions of ignorance. The term agnotology was originally coined by 
Proctor with the help of linguist Iain Boal, and the volume Agnotology: The Making and 
Unmaking of Ignorance (Proctor & Schiebinger 2008) put it on the academic map. Ag-
notology has served as a tool for scholars to uncover cases in which research done for the 
private interest has led to the obstruction of scientific knowledge and its public dissemina-
tion (Elliott 2011; Markowitz & Rosner 2013; McGarity & Wagner 2008; Michaels 2008; 
Oreskes & Conway 2010; Proctor 2012). Such studies have certainly illuminated the limi-
tations of industry-funded research, including research funded by the tobacco industry, the 
petro-chemical industry, and the pharmaceutical industry, among others. However, many 
of these works on agnotology also presuppose a normative distinction between knowledge 
and ignorance, which still needs important philosophical input.
As I have argued elsewhere in detail (Fernández Pinto 2015), most contributions to 
agnotology make broad claims regarding what counts as proper scientific knowledge and 
should be protected, and what counts as scientific ignorance, and should be prevented, 
without proper justification or without considering relevant exceptions.1 Instead of pre-
supposing that scientific ignorance is detrimental to science, this paper aims to contribute 
to this discussion by clarifying what scientific ignorance is, identifying different sources of 
scientific ignorance, and examining in which cases scientific ignorance can be considered 
detrimental to the goals of research. In this way, the argument of the paper offers a more 
philosophically complex and nuanced view of scientific ignorance. 
One should also notice that other social studies scholars who do not agree with the 
framework of agnotology, but still work on the social studies of ignorance, have advocated 
for a more descriptive and sociological approach to the study of ignorance in science (e.g., 
Frickel et al. 2010; Gross & McGoey 2015). While acknowledging these important contri-
butions, my aim in this paper is to enrich the philosophical discussion of the study of igno-
rance, maintaining its normative dimension.
3. What is scientific ignorance?
To start, let me clarify what I understand by scientific ignorance. An important distinc-
tion for the present argument, which is not commonly acknowledged in the social studies 
of ignorance, is the distinction between the conception of ignorance and the sources of ig-
norance. Sociologists of science have argued convincingly that scientific knowledge is the 
product of social processes that lead scientists to certain beliefs, identified as knowledge by 
the scientific community (Bloor 1976; Latour & Woolgar 1979; Shapin & Shaffer 1985). 
More recent studies have made a similar point with respect to the production of ignorance 
1 For a similar critique, see the introduction to Gross and McGoey (2015). For a discussion about the 
positive aspects of ignorance, see Wehling (2015).
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(Croissant 2014; Frickel 2014; Frickel et  al. 2010; Gross & McGoey 2015). Meanwhile, 
philosophers of science have provided different epistemological accounts of scientific 
knowledge that try to incorporate its social dimensions (Longino 2002; Kitcher 2001; Sol-
omon 2001; Kourany 2010). This social epistemology of science aims at providing a social 
conception of scientific knowledge, i.e., a philosophical account of what scientific knowl-
edge is, where scientific knowledge is understood at the same time as the product of social 
forces. Within this framework, one can still make a conceptual distinction between what 
we currently understand as scientific knowledge, or in this case, ignorance, i.e., a working 
definition or conception of ignorance, and the different processes or factors leading to it. 
For the sake of the argument, I will first establish a working definition of scientific igno-
rance, and then I will proceed to examine its sources. 
In the paper, I follow what epistemologists call the standard view of ignorance, accord-
ing to which ignorance is the lack or absence of knowledge, encompassing states of false be-
lief, unjustified true beliefs, and non-belief (Le Morvan & Peels 2016). This is certainly not 
the only available epistemological conception of ignorance. The current debate in the epis-
temology of ignorance contrasts the standard view with what has been called the new view, 
according to which ignorance is just the lack or absence of true belief, and not the absence 
of knowledge as the standard view states.2 The views differ, among other things, in their 
treatment of unjustified true belief, which would be considered a case of ignorance in the 
standard view, but not in the case of the new view. I follow the traditional definition for 
the sake of argumentative clarity, and because I consider it fits better with our evaluation 
of cases of methodological biases, as will become clear in section five. Moreover, given that 
works on agnotology are not clear about their conception of ignorance (Fernández Pinto 
2015), I start with the standard definition to see how far it takes us; further limitations and 
challenges to this standard conception will be left for later. Perhaps a parallel analysis to the 
one proposed in this paper can be made following the new view of ignorance, or other al-
ternative conceptions.
The working conception of knowledge is contextual and intersubjective, depending 
on the beliefs, standards, and self-regulatory processes of scientific communities (Longino 
2002). Thus, this conception of knowledge (or ignorance) is historically and geographically 
located, following the different times and places in which scientific disciplines develop. 
Identifying cases of scientific ignorance, accordingly, depends on what scientific communi-
ties sanction as knowledge, i.e., beliefs that result from following the standardized processes 
of knowledge production. Following the standard view, beliefs that do not meet such re-
quirements, i.e., beliefs whose production has failed to meet the standards, are not consid-
ered knowledge, but ignorance.
To clarify, endorsing the standard view of ignorance is not synonymous with endors-
ing the traditional understanding of ignorance as native state. The standard view is only 
providing an analytic definition of ignorance, without saying anything about the origins 
of such ignorance, whereas the conception of ignorance as native state emphasizes the fact 
that ignorance is natural or given. In this sense, the standard definition serves as a tool for 
identifying cases of scientific ignorance, e.g., when people are misguided about certain sci-
entific beliefs, independently of the factors that led to such beliefs. 
2 For a summary of the main arguments on both sides, see Le Morvan and Peels (2016).
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While holding the idea of ignorance as non-knowledge, my interest in this paper is to 
identify different ways in which the actors involved in the epistemic practice of scientific 
research—mainly scientists, but also policy-makers, funders, and the like—can become ig-
norant. In this sense, the paper follows an understanding of ignorance as a social product 
and aims to identify the factors leading to states of ignorance. Finally, I am not interested 
in the production of ignorance in general, but specifically in the production of ignorance 
that emerges from scientific research. Thus, when I talk about scientific ignorance, I am re-
ferring to a state of non-knowledge resulting from scientific research. I will now turn to 
characterize the different ways in which scientific ignorance can come about. 
4. Sources of scientific ignorance
The production of scientific ignorance, as Proctor has highlighted, has at least two sources. 
On the one hand, ignorance emerges as an inevitable by-product of the search for knowl-
edge. On the other hand, ignorance can also be deliberately created and maintained. Start-
ing with this broad distinction, this section examines in more detail the types of inevitable 
and deliberate sources of scientific ignorance, as well as sources that are not so easily classifi-
able in these two groups. 
4.1. Knowledge and ignorance two sides of the same coin
The production of scientific knowledge goes hand in hand with the production of scien-
tific ignorance or, to put it another way, scientific ignorance is, in a sense, a counterpart to 
scientific knowledge. As science renders better knowledge about the world we live in, it in-
evitably leads to new states of non-knowledge or ignorance. This happens in at least three 
ways: first, given the fact that scientists have to make different decisions during the re-
search process; second, given the fallibility of research results; and third, given the limita-
tions of human cognition. All of these sources of ignorance are inseparable from empirical 
inquiry, and hence inevitable, as will become clear in what follows. 
A first inevitable source of scientific ignorance is related to the decision process in 
science, or what Proctor called, selective ignorance (2008, 3). Due to limited time and re-
sources, scientists cannot explore every possible line of research. Accordingly, some lines 
of research, and some research questions need to be chosen on top of others. The more 
we know about certain things, the further apart and the less likely to know about oth-
ers. Ian Hacking made this point using weapons research as an example: “When so much 
knowledge is created by and for weaponry, it is not only our actual facts and the con-
tent of knowledge, that are affected. The possible facts, the nature of the (ideal) world in 
which we live become determined” (Hacking 1999, 167). In a way, Kuhn (1962) made 
a similar point when suggesting that paradigms determine the scope and type of ques-
tions to be answered by researchers. In this way, current scientific research limits future 
research. 
In addition to choosing certain lines of research over others, scientific ignorance also 
emerges through the selection of different paths within the research process. As Kevin Elli-
ott (2013, 2015) identifies, selective ignorance also stems from choices about how to study 
a complex topic in some way rather than others, what sort of information to collect, and 
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how to disseminate such information (see also, Cosgrove et  al. 2016; Holman & Bruner 
2015; Sismondo 2009). In this sense, selecting a line of research over others is just one deci-
sion in the scientific process among many, inevitably contributing to the production of sci-
entific ignorance. 
In addition to its inevitability, selective ignorance has also a positive side, since new re-
search also illuminates the boundaries of what we are ignorant about, but capable of know-
ing. Robert Merton called it specified ignorance:
In anything but a paradoxical sense, newly acquired knowledge produces newly acquired ig-
norance. For the growth of knowledge and understanding within a field of inquiry brings with 
it the growth of specifiable and specified ignorance: a new awareness of what is not yet known or 
understood and a rationale for its being worth the knowing. (Merton 1987, 8)
Karl Popper made a similar point: “The more we learn about the world, and the deeper 
our learning, the more conscious, specific, and articulate will be our knowledge of what we 
do not know, our knowledge of our ignorance” (1963, 38). Thus, the selection processes 
leading the advancement of science also help scientists specify their ignorance, or in other 
words, determine what they do not know, but should get to know if they concentrate their 
efforts in that direction. In fact, specified ignorance has been considered a fundamental 
motor of scientific research, driving scientists toward achievable epistemic goals (Firestein 
2012; Kerwin 1993; Kuhn 1962). Specified ignorance emerges hand in hand with scientific 
knowledge, and also bolsters the acquisition of new knowledge. It is thus an epistemically 
valuable aspect of selective ignorance. 
Selective ignorance however can also be socially detrimental, even when epistemi-
cally adequate. Although making choices during the research process is inevitable, and so 
is the scientific ignorance that emerges, what choices are made is a matter of controversy. 
To choose might be inevitable, but surely we must have good reasons to prefer certain 
options over others. As David Hess (2015) argues, scientific knowledge is not indiffer-
ent to the unequal distribution of power in society, and thus, scientists make choices that 
systematically benefit those who are in positions of economic privilege and power, un-
dermining those who are not. The resulting undone science, i.e., the ignorance about the 
issues that mostly affect the poor and socially marginalized, could be the result of scien-
tists making unjust decisions when facing some of the decisions previously identified—
what to research, how to research it, how to communicate results, and so on. It could 
also be the result of current financial schemes, in which research mainly targets industrial 
interests (Carrier 2008). In both cases, selective ignorance can be, and certainly has been, 
in many cases, socially inappropriate. 
A second and equally inevitable source of scientific ignorance, different from selective 
ignorance, stems from the intrinsic fallibility of scientific results, also known as scientific 
uncertainty. As the history of science clearly shows, results of scientific research very often 
turn out to be false in the long run. Even the most well-regarded theories, Newtonian me-
chanics being the paradigmatic example, have been eventually replaced by more accurate 
or even completely different scientific theories. Statements that the old theory considered 
true, turn out to be false under the new theory. This is an old problem for philosophers of 
science, who have dedicated many pages to the study of fallibility and uncertainty in scien-
tific reasoning. The empiricist philosopher David Hume famously examined this issue in 
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terms of the problem of induction, or the inescapable uncertainty intrinsic to the inductive 
reasoning proper of studying natural phenomena from experience (Hume 1748 [1999], 
115). Given the lack of demonstrative reasoning to prove matters of fact, scientists appeal 
to inductive reasoning, together with the idea that past experiences of cause and effect will 
still hold in the future. But this idea is fallible. Or in other words, the results of scientific 
inquiry can only render probable results, never certainty. 
The uncertainty of scientific findings is not only inescapable, but also, in a sense, valua-
ble. After all, the fallibility of research results is what makes science revisable and non-dog-
matic. Hence, the problem of induction makes scientific inquiry at the same time empir-
ically accurate, i.e., based on the best available evidence, and prone to error, i.e., without 
warrant that results will hold in the future. Here again, the production of scientific knowl-
edge goes hand in hand with the production of scientific ignorance: as scientists seek better 
explanations of the phenomena, their findings can always be wrong. 
A third possible source of inevitable ignorance in science comes from human cognitive 
limitations. The same cognitive system that allows us to understand and explain the world 
around us, also sets limits to the possibilities of our knowing. Research in behavioral psy-
chology has shown how cognitive biases affect human behavior (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974; Nisbett and Ross 1980), making us less rational than expected. Human cognitive ca-
pacities have been adapted to make optimal decisions under environmental pressures, us-
ing different heuristics and biases. While these mechanisms seem to work well most of the 
time—we are efficient decision-makers—they can easily be misapplied (Lilienfeld et  al. 
2009), leading us to unwarranted and sometimes blatantly wrong conclusions. A good ex-
ample of this is confirmation bias: the tendency to seek evidence that supports our beliefs, 
while dismissing or reinterpreting evidence that goes against them. While this mechanism 
might prove useful in some circumstances, e.g., when meeting a complete stranger and try-
ing to assess whether her testimony is true or not, it can easily backfire if no evidence can 
make us question our beliefs. 
As a human endeavor, science is no different. Cognitive biases affect scientific research 
in different ways. For instance, scientists are prone to asymmetric attention bias—dou-
ble-checking unexpected results, while giving a free-pass to expected ones—and to hypoth-
esis myopia—looking for evidence to support their hypothesis, while ignoring evidence 
against it (Nuzzo 2015). Cognitive biases can be a source of scientific ignorance in so far as 
they lead scientists to wrong or unjustified conclusions. They are also difficult to identify 
and counteract, since we are not aware of them. In fact, cognitive biases appear as intuitive 
evolutionary responses most of the time (Croskerry et al. 2013). However, they can also be 
actively counteracted through a series of debiasing techniques, such as explicitly consider-
ing alternative hypothesis or inviting others to double-check your results (Nuzzo 2015). 
Although debiasing mechanisms require constant vigilance of one’s behavior as well as re-
flection and critical thinking (Crosskerry 2015), which makes them costly and unlikely to 
work under pressure and time constraints, they can be effective under the appropriate cir-
cumstances (Lilienfeld et al. 2009). Accordingly, while cognitive biases might present im-
portant limitations to the production of scientific knowledge, they are not completely un-
avoidable. They are inevitable in so far as they are part of our cognitive capacities, and they 
might be considered an inevitable source of ignorance, insofar as we cannot keep them in 
check all the time. However, they can be controlled, at least to certain extent, through debi-
asing techniques. 
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4.2. Deliberate ignorance 
Ignorance is the unavoidable result of the quest for knowledge. Ignorance, however, also 
emerges deliberately from the way scientific research is sometimes conducted to deliver cer-
tain results and not others. While this may happen in a variety of ways, perhaps the clearest 
case of deliberate ignorance is the case of blatant scientific fraud through fabrication or fal-
sification of data, i.e., when scientists make up data or alter research results. Cases of scien-
tific fraud are broadly repudiated in science: when a case of blatant fraud is demonstrated, 
scientists can quickly lose their jobs and reputation, which normally means the end of their 
career. 
Consider, for example, infamous cases of fraud, such as Andrew Wakefield’s and 
Hwang Woo-suk’s. Wakefield was the physician who published an article in The Lancet ar-
guing for a connection between vaccines and autism (Wakefield et al. 1998), while Woo-
suk was the South Korean researcher whose publications in Science made him at the time 
one of the world-leading expert in creating human embryonic stem cells through cloning 
(Woo-suk et al. 2004, 2005). In both of these cases, allegations of fraud led to in-depth in-
vestigations of the research behind these publications, the scientists involved were accused 
of fabricating data, and the papers were retracted. 
Although blatant cases of scientific fraud receive clear disapproval from the scientific 
community, the evidence unfortunately suggests that fraud might be more frequent than 
expected, and that there are many gray-zones in the research process, where scientific mis-
conduct might be lurking (Fanelli 2009). In any case, the fabrication and falsification of 
data is an important source of scientific ignorance, in which scientists purposely mislead 
their peers towards false or unjustified belief. Contrary to the inevitable sources of igno-
rance previously described, there is no necessity and no inherent value (social or epistemic) 
in scientific fraud. Without controversy, fraud is a detrimental practice in scientific re-
search.
4.3. Less transparent cases
Scientific fraud is a transparent case of ignorance production, leading the scientific com-
munity, policy makers, and even the public at large to accept results that are wrong or not 
properly justified. It is also clearly deliberate. Regardless the motivations, fraud cases re-
quire scientists to actively alter the standard procedures of data collection and interpreta-
tion. Other cases of ignorance production are less transparent. Research requires scientists 
to make a number of decisions and methodological choices at different stages, decisions un-
derdetermined by the available evidence, in which scientists have to appeal to other criteria 
for choice. 
For instance, scientists decide how to pose the main research question, which out-
comes to measure, how to present data for publication, how to interpret the results from 
available data, etc. Such decisions are proper of the research process, and all scientists make 
them at some point. Normally, they appeal to the epistemic standards of their disciplines or 
to their scientific intuition (their scientific bon sens, in Duhem’s words) to make the most 
appropriate decisions for obtaining reliable results. However, it is also possible for scien-
tists to follow other criteria in making such choices, the sum of which can predetermine re-
search results. Such biased methodological decisions can shape research results in order to 
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obtain expected results. This is a fifth way in which scientific ignorance emerges: scientists 
are not properly justified to believe results following the introduction of methodological 
biases.
A more detailed examination of methodological biases will follow in the next section. 
For now, notice that methodological biases are not easily classifiable as inevitable or delib-
erate sources of ignorance. On the one hand, introducing biases through methodological 
decisions can be a deliberate process, one in which scientists clearly understand how a mi-
nor decision in experimental design, for example, can shape the results of research, moving 
them closer to expected outcomes. On the other hand, methodological biases can be tied 
to entrenched practices within a scientific community, where individual scientists do not 
understand that some standardized methodological decisions are actually biasing research 
results. Accordingly, scientific ignorance emerging from methodological biases can be in 
some cases the result of deliberate decisions, and in other cases the result of entrenched sci-
entific practices not necessarily understood as biased. 
In sum, there are different sources of ignorance in science. Some of them are inevitable, 
for they come together with the process of knowledge production. Ignorance emerges given 
that research results are fallible even when reliable, given that scientists ought to choose 
some lines of research over others, and also given our human cognitive limitations. In such 
cases, knowledge and ignorance seem two sides of the same coin. Other sources of igno-
rance are, however, deliberate and thus avoidable. The clearest case is scientific fraud: when 
scientists purposely misrepresent results leading the scientific community to false or unjus-
tified beliefs. Finally, some sources of ignorance are not so clearly classifiable as inevitable 
or deliberate. Methodological biases are one example, in which scientists make micro-deci-
sions in the research process that predetermine desired results. Such conduct might be con-
sidered deliberate in some cases, and thus closer to scientific fraud, while in other cases, sci-
entists are just following entrenched practices in their disciplines without acknowledging 
that they are biasing their research results, making these cases similar to cognitive biases. Ig-
norance results in both cases, given that we lack proper justification for believing scientific 
findings from such biased inquiries. However, notice that the moral responsibility of the 
individual scientist seems very different: we would be hesitant to blame the scientist acting 
according to disciplinary standards of scientific misconduct, but we would presumably be 
less charitable towards the scientist who introduces methodological biases deliberately. In 
order to understand better in which way the introduction of methodological biases is detri-
mental to scientific research and how to prevent it, a more detailed analysis is needed. 
5. The problems, illustrated by clinical research
The last section introduced different sources of scientific ignorance. Among them, meth-
odological biases seemed particularly difficult to categorize: they can be both deliberately 
introduced by individual scientists or automatically followed by the community without 
notice. This section examines with more detail the introduction of methodological bi-
ases in research. The aim is to better understand how biasing micro-decisions in the re-
search process are introduced, and how they lead to scientific ignorance. Having a bet-
ter grasp of methodological biases can also help to create better strategies to mitigate and 
prevent them. 
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Taking clinical research as an example, I present three ways in which methodological 
biases are introduced in the research process leading to epistemically detrimental results: 
(i) by using placebos or inaccurate doses of the best alternative treatments for the control 
group in clinical trials, (ii) by selecting or changing the primary outcome post hoc, and (iii) 
by presenting results in favorable but inappropriate ways. 
5.1. Comparison groups and doses
In clinical research, investigators have a number of methodological decisions to make during 
the research process, such as choosing the specific question the trial aims to answer, choosing 
the specific patient population for the trial, choosing the comparison group against which 
the new treatment is tried, determining the dosage for both the control and the treatment 
groups, picking a specific outcome or endpoint to measure, deciding how to interpret and 
present results, deciding whether to publish the results or not, and so forth. Each of these de-
cisions has a spectrum of epistemically legitimate choices. Methodological biases appear pre-
cisely when making decisions beyond the spectrum of what is epistemically (or methodologi-
cally, if you prefer) appropriate, jeopardizing the reliability of the results. 
Methodological biases can be introduced, for instance, when choosing comparison 
groups and doses. In clinical trials, new treatments can be compared against a control group 
taking placebo or a control group taking an effective available treatment. Although placebo 
controlled groups are in many cases necessary for determining the effectiveness of the new 
treatment (Bero & Rennie 1996, 216), a number of ethical issues have been raised regard-
ing placebo controlled trials. One major issue has to do with denying patients in the con-
trol group, who are suffering from the medical condition being studied, an effective availa-
ble treatment (WHO 2013, §32). 
Beyond the ethical reasons for avoiding placebo controlled trials, there are also compel-
ling epistemic reasons. Placebo controlled trials might be telling us whether a drug is better 
than nothing, but if other effective treatments are already available, this is far from suffi-
cient. What we really want to know, what would be significant in terms of advancing cur-
rent knowledge, is whether the new treatment is better than the best available one. Despite 
these good ethical and epistemic reasons, around one third of phase 3 clinical trials with al-
ternative treatments available are still designed as only placebo-controlled trials (Goldberg 
et  al. 2011). Results of a good number of clinical trials are not relevant for patients cur-
rently suffering for the medical condition being studied due to the way investigators set the 
comparison groups. 
A similar issue arises when researchers choose to compare the new treatment against 
too small a dose of the alternative treatment, making the drug seem ineffective, or against 
too high a dose of the alternative treatment, making the secondary effects much worse 
(Bero & Rennie 1996; Smith 2005). Using doses outside the standard range has proved 
successful in establishing either the efficacy or the benefits of new treatments compared 
to available alternatives. Clinical trials on new antipsychotic medication for the treatment 
of schizophrenia are good examples, where old treatments, such as haloperidol or risperi-
done, were given at higher doses than normally used, almost ensuring the experience of un-
comfortable side effects, which in turn led to favorable results for the new treatment (Safer 
2002; Goldacre 2012). Here again, a (small) decision in the experimental design can easily 
lead to the favorable outcome. 
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5.2. Post hoc endpoints
Another way in which methodological biases lead to scientific ignorance in clinical re-
search is related to picking the endpoints or outcomes to be measured during the trial. Ac-
cording to protocol, researchers should specify the primary outcome to be measured, i.e., 
the most significant outcome to be examined during the study, before the trial starts. One 
powerful epistemic reason for establishing the primary outcome before the trial is to re-
duce multiple analyses that might render false-positive results. If one measures many out-
comes in the same trial, some are likely to show statistically significant results just due to 
chance. Hence, picking only one primary outcome reduces the risk of randomly obtain-
ing significant results (Andrade 2015). After all, the goal is to determine whether the new 
treatment provides real benefits, and not just randomly generated results. In this way, 
transparency with respect to the primary outcome measure of a clinical trial contributes 
to its internal validity. 
Starting clinical trials with multiple outcomes is, however, a common way of ensuring 
that the new treatment is comparatively superior. If instead of identifying one primary out-
come, researchers work with a number of them, say ten, while using a per-comparison error 
rate, then they can expect to find a statistically significant result at least in one of these out-
comes. The probability of obtaining at least one significant result increases at the cost of in-
creasing risk of false positives. The problem emerges again: researchers can predetermine fa-
vorable trial results by measuring a number of outcomes and then establishing the primary 
outcome, or changing the original primary outcome with an alternative outcome, once they 
have identified which outcome has positive results. Although many have questioned such 
practice (Bero & Rennie 1996; Goldacre 2012; Safer 2002; Smith 2005; Srinivas 2015), 
also known as post hoc analysis or data dredging, researchers have found it to be fairly com-
mon (Chan et  al. 2004; Gøtzsche 1989; Vedula et  al. 2009). So here is a second way in 
which a decision made during the research process can lead to desired results.  
5.3. Risk reduction measures
Scientists can also introduce methodological biases at the end of the research process, when 
deciding how tho present research results. For instance, let’s say that a clinical trial showed 
that the new treatment was effective in reducing the risk of developing a certain medical 
condition. There are at least two ways of presenting this risk reduction: showing an abso-
lute risk reduction measure—i.e., the difference between the probability of the outcome in 
the treatment group and the probability of the outcome in the control group—or show-
ing a relative risk reduction measure—i.e., the percentage of risk reduction of the treatment 
group compared to the control group. Goldacre illustrates this point as follows:
Let’s say your chances of a heart attack in the next year are high: forty people out of 1,000 like 
you will have a heart attack in the next year, or if you prefer, 4 per cent of people like you. Let’s 
say those people are treated with a statin, and their risk is reduced, so only twenty of them will 
have a heart attack, or 2 per cent. We could say this is ‘a 50 per cent reduction in the risk of heart 
attack’, because it’s gone from 4 per cent to 2 per cent [...]. But we could also express the same 
change in risk as the ‘absolute risk reduction’, the change from 4 per cent to 2 per cent, which 
makes a change of 2 per cent, or ‘a 2 per cent reduction in the risk of heart attack’. (Goldacre 
2012, 217)
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Although both risk reduction measures stem from the same facts, they convey different 
information. Absolute risk reduction expresses risk reduction in terms of how much the 
treatment has reduced the risk of developing the condition (or in other words the percent-
age of patients who will not develop the condition thanks to the treatment), which tends 
to render small percentages; while relative risk reduction expresses how much the treat-
ment reduced the risk of developing the condition compared to the control group where 
no treatment was given, which tends to render big percentages. In the example above, 
while the relative risk reduction was 50%, the absolute risk reduction was 2%. Studies have 
shown that presenting research results in terms of relative risk reduction leads to overesti-
mating the effectiveness of the treatment and, in turn, to a higher number of prescriptions 
(Covey 2007). Given that both measures are just giving different information about the 
same facts, the discrepancy shouldn’t exist, which leads us to think that doctors are misun-
derstanding relative risk reduction measures and probably overestimating the effectiveness 
of the intervention. Indeed, such misunderstanding can be explained by the reference class 
fallacy, according to which relative risk reduction measures are mistakenly taken for abso-
lute risk reduction measures. Following the previous example, the fallacy occurs when the 
statement “a 50% reduction in heart attack risk” is mistakenly taken to mean that a patient 
taking the treatment will be 50% less likely to develop the condition (Sprenger & Stegenga 
2017; Stegenga 2015). Accordingly, it would be questionable to present research outcomes 
in terms of relative risk reduction measures.
As usual, the devil is in the details. Although both absolute and relative risk reduction 
measures stem from the same facts, doctors and patients interpret this information very 
differently. Moreover, for calculating the risk for an individual patient, only the absolute 
risk reduction measure is relevant (Sprenger & Stegenga 2017). Accordingly, if investiga-
tors choose to present results only in terms of a relative risk reduction measure, they are 
promoting the misunderstanding of the results in favor of the new treatment. As the exam-
ple shows, scientists decide which measure of risk reduction to present. The methodologi-
cally sound decision is to present an absolute risk reduction measure, and the methodolog-
ically biased decision is to present a relative risk reduction measure, which in turn misleads 
others. 
5.4. Discussion
In sum, decisions during the scientific research process can end up shaping research out-
comes in epistemically inappropriate ways, fomenting ignorance through establishing false 
or unjustified beliefs as proper scientific knowledge. As the example of antipsychotic med-
ications shows, the trials did not really prove that the new drugs had fewer side effects, but 
they appear to do so given the results. Thus, the belief that the new treatments are better in 
this respect is unjustified, or even false (something we cannot know until trials with proper 
doses are conducted). And these are only some instances in which biased methodologi-
cal decisions lead to ignorance, instead of knowledge, within the scientific process. Several 
different strategies such as these have been identified in medical research (Bero & Rennie 
1996; Safer 2002; Smith 2005). 
Methodological biases can create a detrimental epistemic gap. In this section, I have 
shown how biased micro-decisions during the research process can inadequately predeter-
mine research results, disseminating ignorance in science, as well as opening a gap between 
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what we could and should know, and what we actually know and don’t know. I consider 
this a detrimental epistemic gap given that the scientific community is perfectly capable of 
obtaining relevant and reliable results, but the process is obstructed by epistemically inap-
propriate decisions. The gap is epistemic, given that it impedes the production and dissem-
ination of scientific knowledge, but it has both epistemic and ethical consequences. Actors 
involved in the scientific process know less than they could and should know, and this lack 
of knowledge ends up causing unnecessary suffering. This becomes particularly clear in the 
case of medical research, where false or unjustified beliefs about medical treatments can eas-
ily compromise patients’ health and their families’ well-being or, in Kerwin’s words, “medi-
cal ignorance hurts” (1993, 175). 
As previously noted, methodological biases present a further challenge, given that they 
are not easily understood as deliberate or not. It is clear that scientists introduce method-
ological biases while making decisions in the research process, but it is not clear whether 
these decisions are deliberate, i.e., scientists know they are biasing the process to obtain 
expected results, or just result from following entrenched methodological standards, i.e., 
scientists are not aware of the biases they are introducing. 
To illustrate the former, consider the use of “spins” or distorted presentation of results 
in research papers. A study of a representative sample of randomized controlled trials with 
uncontested non-significant results (Bourton et al. 2010) found that 49 of the 72 abstracts 
had a spin on the results, and 28 had no numerical results for the primary outcome of the 
trial at all reported in the paper. In other words, a decision had been made to conceal the 
main results of the trial. Given that not reporting the main results of a trial cannot conceiv-
ably become standardized practice, we have good reasons to believe that the lack of report-
ing in this case is deliberate.
To illustrate the latter, consider the case of “p-hacking” and the reproducibility crisis 
in psychology, as well as neuroscience and other life sciences. The publication of the Open 
Science Collaboration study “Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science” 
(2015) gave proof of a suspected major methodological issue in psychology research: the 
fact that several experimental and correlational psychology studies could not be replicated 
despite having obtained significant results with a 95% confidence interval in the original 
studies. Among other methodological biases, the unexpected irreproducibility of results 
was attributed to “p-hacking” or the selection of data or statistical analyses until signifi-
cant results (p < 0.05) are obtained (Head et al. 2015). The point here being that method-
ological biases were common practice among researchers (John, et al. 2012; Simmons, et al. 
2011), and their methodological appropriateness was not questioned. In fact, methodolog-
ical biases have been so common in many life sciences that the possibility that most pub-
lished scientific findings might be false has been considered (Ioannidis 2005). In this sense, 
presumably many researchers were trained in p-hacking techniques, without realizing these 
were actually biasing their results. 
Although many cases of methodological bias might not be easily discernible as either 
deliberate decision or normalized practice, the distinction is crucial for creating mitiga-
tion and prevention strategies. On the one hand, normalized practices that introduce 
methodological biases ought to be identified and transformed. This is precisely what is 
happening with the reproducibility crisis in psychology and neuroscience today, where 
many are advocating for blind data analysis, pre-registration for studies, where meth-
ods and analyses are established before data collection, as well as encouraging replication 
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studies and their publication (Chambers et  al. 2014; Head et  al. 2015). On the other 
hand, deliberate introduction of methodological biases in research might be difficult to 
prove, but when possible, we have good reasons to approach it as a case of scientific fraud 
or misconduct. After all, scientists are deliberately biasing research to obtain a desired re-
sult, which not only compromises the epistemic reliability of the findings, but also pre-
sents potential health or environmental hazards. In other words, this deliberate pro-
duction of scientific ignorance can also have negative social consequences. In this sense, 
individual scientists are also morally responsible for the social consequences of their epis-
temic shortcomings. 
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide a philosophical analysis of scientific ignorance. Af-
ter providing a tentative definition of scientific ignorance as a state of non-knowledge re-
sulting from scientific research, I examined different sources of scientific ignorance. While 
some sources of scientific ignorance come inevitably with the process of knowledge acqui-
sition, others are deliberately created. The former includes selection processes, inductive 
reasoning, and cognitive biases, while the latter includes scientific fraud. Another impor-
tant source of scientific ignorance appears when scientists introduce methodological bi-
ases through micro-decisions in the research process. Such biases can lead scientists, policy-
makers, and the general public to hold unjustified or even false beliefs. In addition to this 
epistemic flaw, such ignorance can also have significant social consequences in terms of en-
vironmental and human health. In this sense, methodological biases ought to be properly 
identified and prevented. I have argued, however, that this might not be as easy, given that 
methodological biases can be the result of deliberate decisions of individual scientists or 
just the result of entrenched practices within a discipline, and discerning between these op-
tions might not be obvious. When able to identify whether a case of methodological bias is 
deliberate or not, I have argued that deliberate cases should be regarded as cases of scientific 
fraud, while cases of entrenched biased practices should be followed by concerted efforts to 
acknowledge and transform these practices. 
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